【2020年7月15日】【管理科学与工程系学术讲座】顺风车司乘费用分摊机制研究 Driver-Rider Cost-Sharing Strategies and Equilibria in aRidesharing Program
发布时间:07-14-20

管理科学与工程系学术讲座

题目: 顺风车司乘费用分摊机制研究

Driver-Rider Cost-Sharing Strategies and Equilibria in aRidesharing

Program

演讲人: 王晓蕾,同济大学,副教授

时间: 2020年7月15日 10:00
参与方式: zoom云视频会议;

会议号: 92967653848 会议密码: 530366

讲座摘要:

Dynamic ridesharing apps used to organize ad hoc ridesharing trips betweenstrangers on short notice. To support such real-time on-demand services, cost-sharingbetween drivers and riders is commonly centrally determined by ridesharing apps accordingto prescribed rules. To highlight the impacts of appropriate cost-sharing strategies on

The success of ridesharing programs, this paper models the mode choices of a group ofheterogeneous travelers with continuously distributed values of time in a single-corridornetwork, considering the complex interactions between travelers’ mode choices and theattractiveness of ridesharing in terms of rider/driver waiting/detouring times and matchingprobabilities. The equilibrium state under any given cost-sharing strategy is describedby a system of variational inequalities based on which the existence of equilibria is established.With the proposed modeling framework, various cost-sharing strategies are examinedto avoid mode shifts among transit users to autos and/or reduce vehicular traffic inthe short run; the necessary conditions for cost-sharing strategies to sustain participationand/or reduce vehicle usage are explicitly provided. It is shown that when driving aloneis faster but more expensive than public transit, no cost-sharing strategy exists to sustainan active ridesharing platform without inducing transit users to join the ridesharingprogram. Moreover, the existence of cost-sharing strategies capable of reducing vehiculartraffic on the road is not always guaranteed, depending on the costs of driving alone andtaking public transit in the considered corridor, fuel prices, and travelers’ prioritizationof safety and privacy. Furthermore, it is found that the initial state with no ridesharingparticipants is an equilibrium under any cost-sharing strategy if the additional costincurred by a traveler through participating in a ridesharing program is nonnegative. Thisexplains the difficulty of initiating a ridesharing program and implies the initial necessityof subsidizing all intended riders and/or drivers to encourage participation.

演讲嘉宾简介:

王晓蕾,博士,同济大学经济与管理学院管理科学与工程系副教授。

 

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