题目: Partnerships Between Taxis and On-Demand Ride-Hailing Platforms: A Regulatory Perspective
演讲人: FANG Xin，Singapore Management University
时间: 2023年9月12日上午 10:00
地点: 同济大厦A楼403教室 腾讯会议（线上同步）
会议号：498 716 832
Problem Definition: Partnerships between on-demand ride-hailing platforms and traditional taxi companies allow the platforms to expand their supply of service capacity and improve service quality, and also provide taxi drivers the access to a new demand stream. We look at these partnerships from the perspective of a regulator and study how they should be managed.
Academic/Practical Relevance: The arrival of on-demand ride-hailing platforms has posed challenges to local and national governments about regulating the relations between these newcomers and incumbent taxi services. The set of current regulatory approaches varies from strong encouragement of taxi drivers’ participation in platform-based service delivery to equally strong drive to separate street-hailing and platform-based services. Given this variety of regulatory stances, we address a natural question about conditions that favor each particular approach.
Methodology: We develop a parsimonious game-theoretical model of a government-regulated urban transportation system. In our model, consumers of transportation services are sensitive to both price and service delays. There are two distinct groups of service providers, taxi drivers who can use both street-hailing and platform-based modes of service delivery, and private car drivers who can serve consumers only via the platform. The platform controls the service fee and driver wages for platform-based services, and the government sets the fee for street-hailing services, and the level of access that taxi drivers can have to the platform-based riding requests.
Managerial Implications: In the absence of pressure to preserve street-hailing, the optimal regulatory stance is to ensure either “full” or “partial” access of taxi drivers to the platform-based requests. However, in settings where some degree of reliance on street-hailing is present, the government should exercise a measured control over taxi drivers’ access to the platform-based requests if the number of private car drivers and the pressure to preserve street-hailing are both low, and otherwise the government should aim to confine taxi drivers to street-hailing separating the two driver groups.
FANG Xin is Associate Professor of Operations Management and Director of PhD Programmes at Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University. He earned his Ph.D. in Operations Management from Carnegie Mellon University in 2014, and his B.S. in Information Systems from Fudan University in 2008. Xin studies the problems related to competition and coopetition in global supply chains and digital economy. His research applies cooperative and non-cooperative game theory as well as the theory of social and economic networks to the areas of decentralized distribution systems, corporate social responsibility and online platforms. His work has been published in journals such as Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research and Production and Operations Management.