经济与金融系学术讨论会第237期

题目：Robust Contracting under Distributional Uncertainty

演讲人：王可心（Singapore Management University, PhD candidate）

时间：2024 年12月20日（周五）12:00-13:00

地点：同济大厦A楼505室

同步#腾讯会议：719211825

会议密码：566235

链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/IAzCJM9t92NI

摘要：We study the design of contracts when the principal has limited statistical information about the output distributions induced by the agent’s actions. In the baseline model, we consider a principal who only knows the mean of the output distribution for each action. The mean restrictions allow for a large set of profiles of output distributions, including some extreme output distributions that can be used to establish the robust optimality of monotone affine contracts. Motivated by this, we study the set of distributions that can be used to establish the robust optimality of the monotone affine contracts. This facilitates the understanding for the use of monotone affine contracts in settings with more restrictions on the output distributions. Our main result shows that the optimality of monotone affine contracts persists even if the principal has access to other information about the output distributions, such as the information that the output distribution induced by each action has full support.

个人简介： Kexin Wang is a PhD candidate in Economics at the School of Economics, Singapore Management University, expected to graduate in June 2025. Her research field is microeconomic theory, with an emphasis on mechanism design. Currently, her research mainly investigates the robust design of mechanisms when the designer lacks exact knowledge of the economic environment.