题  目：Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring on Labor Contracting in Online Platforms : Evidence from a Natural Experiment

主讲人：顾彬,教授,亚利桑那州立大学凯瑞商学院Earl and Gladys Davis讲席教授, 副院长

时  间：2017年8月7日 下午2:00-3:00

地  点: 同济大厦A楼208教室

报告内容摘要

Abstract: Two-sided platforms are typically plagued with hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard), limiting market efficiency. Situated in the context of the increasingly popular online platforms for labor contracting (herein referred to as “online labor markets”), this paper investigates whether the implementation of an IT-enabled monitoring system mitigates moral hazard in online platforms and the consequences thereof. Our identification hinges on a natural experiment at Freelancer when it first introduced an IT-enabled monitoring system in February 2014. Based on a unique dataset including 5,136 fixed-price projects and 2,370 time-based projects matched on observable characteristics, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the treatment effect of the monitoring system implementation on various outcomes from both the employer (demand) side and the contractor (supply) side, including employers’ contractor choice, platform entry barrier and contractors’ information rent. We found that the implementation of the monitoring system lowers the employers’ preference for bidders with the high effort-related reputation in time-based projects, and thus reduces reputation premiums and partially lowers the entry barrier for contractors who have not yet established a reputation on the platform. Specifically, using fixed-price projects as the baseline, on average, the implementation of the monitoring system increased the number of bids by 23.7% (primarily from bidders with no prior experience on the platform) and reduced the price premium in time-based projects by 6.9%. Our results indicate the partial substitution relationship between reputation systems and monitoring systems, and suggest that IT-enabled monitoring systems have a significant effect on alleviating moral hazard, reducing agency costs, and intensifying supply-side platform competition. 

报告人简介 

顾彬GU Bin教授,亚利桑那州立大学凯瑞商学院Earl and Gladys Davis讲席教授，副院长,美国宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院管理科学及应用经济学博士,顾教授目前担任国际信息系统知名学术刊物《MIS季刊》的高级编委，及《信息系统研究》，《决策支持系统》的副编委。2017年，顾教授荣获夏威夷系统科学国际年会最佳论文奖。2016年，他荣获凯瑞商学院最佳教授研究奖。2014年，顾教授荣获《MIS季刊》最佳编委奖。2012和2014年，他两次荣获Emerald管理学科最佳论文奖。2012年，顾教授荣获《零售期刊》最多引用论文奖。2008年, 他荣获《信息系统研究》及美国运筹学与管理学研究协会信息系统分会最佳年度论文奖。