题目: Stock Option Pay Versus Restricted Stock: A Comparative Analysis Of Their Impact On Managerial Risk Taking And Performance Extremeness 演讲人: Wanrong Hou 时间: 2018年6月20日 14:30–16:30 地点: 同济大厦A楼 308 教室

讲座摘要

This study investigates how two alternative stock based incentives affect the risk taking behavior of CEOs. We compare stock options and restricted stock in terms of their impact on the magnitude of investments and performance extremeness. We test our hypotheses using data from 1993 to 2006 for a large sample of S&P 1500 firms. Our results indicate that both stock options and restricted stock increase the magnitude of investments undertaken by CEOs, but that stock options have a much stronger effect. Also, stock option pay increases the likelihood of both big gains and big losses, but restricted stock has the opposite effect on the likelihood of big losses. Finally, we find that as CEO tenure increases the effects of stock-based compensation tend to diminish. Therefore, stock-based incentives appear to be a useful solution to the agency problem for short-tenured CEOs, but much less so for long-tenured CEOs.

演讲人简历

Wanrong Hou 侯万荣 is an associate professor of management at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. He earned his Ph.D at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Lubar School of Business. His areas of research include strategic decision making and corporate governance. His research has been published in a number of management journals including International Journal of Services and Standards, Journal of International Management, and Journal of Management.