时间：2019年12月10日（周二）12:00-13:00

地点：同济大厦A楼505室

题目：Voluntary Disclosure of Negative Information: Experimental Analysis (jointly with Dmitry Shapiro)

（自愿披露负面信息：一个实验经济学的分析）

主讲人：Jaesun Lee（同济大学经济与管理学院 助理教授）

摘要：

We study sellers’ willingness to voluntarily disclose negative information about product quality and their profits as well as buyers’ behavior and social welfare. We conduct a lab experiment for the monopoly and the duopoly settings in which sellers send cheap-talk messages on product quality and set a price while buyers decide whether to purchase the product or not. We show that sellers use cheap-talk messages to communicate their low quality. Revealing negative information has mixed and mostly insignificant effect on profit. In the monopoly treatments, revealing negative information has positive effect on welfare as it increases probability to purchase. In the duopoly treatments, the effect is much weaker and can be significantly negative as it increases buyers’ tendency to purchase a safe low-quality product.