会计系学术报告

时间：2019年12月17日（周二）15:30-17:30

地点：同济大厦A楼309教室

主题一：Social Trust and Attention Allocation  社会信任与注意力分配

主讲人：董毅，上海财经大学会计学院副教授

讲座摘要: Limited attention is a scarce resource that is used to reduce search costs across large and complex choice sets. Investors make decisions only after their attention allocation has rendered an unmanageably-large choice set into a manageably-small choice set. Although previous research has highlighted the importance of attention allocation, few studies have examined the determinants of the attention allocation process. We posit that social trust plays a significant role in allocating an investor’s limited attention. We measure social trust using (asymmetric) bilateral trust scores between pairs of Chinese provinces, and we capture investor attention using online investor posts from a major investment discussion forum. Our results confirm that investors allocate significantly more attention to firms located in provinces with which these investors have high bilateral trust. Consistent with expectations, we also find that bilateral social trust has a greater impact on attention allocations in less-developed regions with weaker institutions. Finally, we show that higher trust leads to more actual investments through social trust’s impact on investor attention. Overall, our study sheds new light on the significant role that social trust plays in shaping investors’ attention allocations. In a nutshell, attention follows trust. 

讲座人简介: 董毅，现任上海财经大学会计学院副教授，本科毕业于北京大学理论与应用力学，博士毕业于新加坡南洋理工大学，获金融学博士。在Applied Economics、, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis等期刊发表论文多篇，主持自科项目多个。近年来获奖如下：上海财经大学第二十五届中振科研基金优秀成果奖（2019）、上海市优秀青年女教师成才资助（2018）、上海市第十四届哲学社会科学优秀成果(2016-2017)学科学学术奖论文类一等奖。 

主题二：The real effect of a property right reform: Evidence from unlisted firms

物权法改革对非上市企业的影响

主讲人：董慧，上海财经大学会计学院 副教授

讲座摘要：The enactment of the 2007 Property Law in China, for the first time, provided legal basis for the equal protection of both public and private ownership. Thus it strengthens the creditor rights and reduces the risk of government expropriation for unlisted firms. A differences-test strategy shows that unlisted firms withhigh levels of tangible assets reduce bank borrowing and turn to supply-chain financing, consistent with their managers weary of the enhanced creditor rights. Those firms also invest less, hire less, but become more efficient and profitable following the changes in the property right institutions. The results we document suggest that reforms in property rights triggered important different effects to improve unlisted firms: unlike listed ones, unlisted firms affected by the reform reduce their investment and employment in the economy.

讲座人简介：董慧，上海财经大学会计学院副教授，中国人民大学管理学学士、伦敦大学学院经济学硕士、香港大学金融学博士。研究方向：公司财务、企业社会责任、审计，银行。在European Accounting Review等期刊发表论文，主持国家自然科学基金项目。