题目： Transparency at Loan Rollover

演讲人： 许海波（同济大学经济与管理学院 助理研究员）

时间：2022年5月17日（周二）12:00-13:00

ZOOM线上会议

会议号:89187657375

密码:439753

摘要： This paper studies how the transparency at loan rollover affects an enterprise’s chance to obtain startup loans. Higher transparency mitigates information asymmetry between inside creditor (who originates startup loan) and external creditors, which facilitates the inside creditor’s possible exit but reduces his information rent when the enterprise rolls over loans. A pass-or-fail test maximizes enterprise borrowing capacity. A pass-or-fail test tailored for a given borrowing need within borrowing capacity maximizes social welfare. Our results demonstrate economic benefits of preserving (some) information asymmetry and echo the evolution of small business disclosure regulation: maintaining sufficient information while allowing more registration exemptions.

个人简介：许海波，圣路易斯华盛顿大学经济学博士，主要研究领域为博弈论、合约理论、公司金融理论，文章发表于《Games and Economic Behavior》、《Economics Letters》、《世界经济》等刊物。