演讲人: 吴志岩 荷兰伊拉斯姆斯大学长聘副教授

时间：2024年7月6日10:00

地点： 同济大厦A楼501教室

演讲摘要：

Using a regression discontinuity design in a sample of U.S. congressional special elections, we investigate how political connections established by one firm (networking firm) create ripple effects on its peers (peer firms) in the same product market, encouraging them to appoint politicians to their boardroom. By analyzing special elections won or lost by a narrow margin, we find that when the networking firm had donated to a politician who narrowly won a special election, its peer firms’ director appointments are 43% higher in the following year than those of firms that had supported a narrowly defeated candidate. The ripple effects are more pronounced among peer firms facing greater political risks and operating in industries with more intense competition for government sales. Additionally, the ripple effects also lead to increased product differentiation among peer firms. We interpret these patterns as evidence of a competitive dynamic mechanism, where peer firms perceive the networking firm’s political connections as a threat that could disadvantage them in the regulatory environment, prompting them to strengthen their boards with political capital to navigate potential regulatory changes and mitigate perceived risks. Our findings enrich scholarly understandings of political connections and director selections.

中文摘要：在美国国会选举样本中，我们使用回归不连续设计研究了一家网络公司建立的政治关系如何对同一产品市场上的同行产生连锁反应，鼓励他们任命政治家进入董事会。通过分析以微弱优势获胜或失败的特别选举发现，当网络公司向以微弱优势赢得特别选举的政治家捐款时，其同行公司在第二年的董事任命比支持以微弱优势失败的候选人的公司高出43%。这种连锁反应在面临更大政治风险、行业竞争更激烈的同行公司中更为明显。此外，连锁反应也导致同业公司之间的产品差异增加。我们将这些模式解释为竞争动态机制的证据，同行公司将网络公司的政治关系视为一种威胁，可能会使他们在监管环境中处于不利地位，促使他们用政治资本加强董事会，以应对潜在的监管变化并减轻感知风险。我们的研究结果丰富了对政治关系和导演选择的学术理解。

演讲嘉宾简介：

吴志岩，荷兰伊拉斯姆斯大学长聘副教授，研究方向主要聚焦战略管理；研究成果发表在Academy of Management Journal、Management Science、Organization Science等UTD-24国际顶刊。