演讲人：李嫦（华东师范大学经济与管理学院 副教授）

时间：2023年9月26日（周二）12:00-13:00

地点：同济大厦A楼505室

同步#腾讯会议：222893774

会议密码：298891

参会链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/nBprGN2QrnDU

摘要：In China’s credit markets with financial repression, state-controlled non-financial firms (SOEs) are privileged in gaining access to bank credit, while non-SOEs, especially those small- and medium-sized firms, are disadvantaged. Corporate re-lending emerges as a response wherein the former secure bank loans and then re-lend to the latter. We document the characteristics of inter-corporate loans from a sample of legal cases. We employ four empirical strategies to conduct a forensic study of re-lending by detecting abnormal relations between financial accounts of listed firms. State-controlled companies conduct more re-lending, and firms with better growth opportunities, stronger corporate governance, and more financial constraints engage less. We compare re-lending with entrusted loans and find that firms extending nonaffiliated entrusted loans conduct re-lending actively, while firms offering affiliated entrusted loans do not. We also compare inter-corporate loans with micro-credit company loans in a review of legal cases.

简介：

李嫦，华东师范大学经济学院副教授，香港中文大学经济学博士，主要研究领域为国际投资与公司金融。近年在Journal of Financial Intermediation、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Comparative Economics、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外重要期刊发表学术论文十余篇，主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。