演讲人: 姜力，教授， 香港理工大学

时间:2023年12月27日 下午2:30~4:00

地点: 同济大厦A308教室

腾讯线上同步

会议号：575 245 688

会议密码：245362

讲座摘要:

We consider a firm selling credence goods to consumers. Each consumer is uncertain about his or her need, which can be either intense or minor. The firm discerns the consumer’s need and can leverage its information advantage to overcharge or overtreat the consumer, who can decline the recommended service. Upon service acceptance, the consumer joins an unobservable queue and waits for receiving service. We demonstrate that the time efficiency (defined as the product of service rate and social surplus) of intense service relative to that of minor service, the composition of consumers in terms of true needs and capacity are crucial to the occurrence and the nature of unethical behavior. As intense service is more time efficient, the firm can be unethical when capacity is low or the need for intense service is high. As minor service is more time efficient, the firm is honest unless capacity is high and the need for intense service is high, in which case, the firm can overcharge. Overtreatment is less likely to occur than overcharging. Information asymmetry causes inefficiency by restricting the incentive of consumers to join the queue. Consumers cannot benefit from selectively accepting the firm’s service recommendations.

Joint work with Xiaokai Wu

演讲嘉宾简介:

姜力，教授，毕业于美国密歇根大学罗斯商学院，获得运营与管理科学博士学位。他于2007年加入香港理工大学物流及海事研究系，现为终身教授，并为西安交通大学客座教授。主要研究方向为数据驱动、信息共享、信任商品、行为运营、共享经济平台。他的研究成果主要发表在Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics等国际顶级和重要学术期刊上，同时参与这些期刊的编审工作。2018年被欧洲运筹学协会表彰为杰出学术贡献，2021年入选教育部“长江学者”，2022年被评为国家讲座教授。