演讲人：陆卓然（复旦大学管理学院 助理教授）

时间：2023年10月31日（周二）12:00-13:00

地点：同济大厦A楼505室

同步#腾讯会议：543801133

会议密码：322999

链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/OX6AKydoM9o2

摘要：Motivated by the rapid development of usage-based insurance (UBI), we study relational contracts under moral hazard in a competitive insurance market. The insurer can employ both an objective and a subjective signal about the insured’s behavior as, respectively, the explicit and implicit incentive components of the contract. We show that under limited liability the subjective signal may not be used when it is relatively noisy even if it were enforceable. Moreover, the objective and subjective signals can be both complements and substitutes. Whereas a more accurate subjective signal always improves the insurance market efficiency, the welfare implication of the objective signal accuracy can be non-monotonic. In particular, when a more accurate objective signal makes the fallback of the relational contract relatively attractive, it may reduce the efficiency of the relational contract, or even render all relational contracts infeasible. Our results suggest that the regulation of UBI markets that improve the enforceability of subjective signal can mitigate the distortion in the design of UBI contracts and the ex-ante investment in related monitoring technologies.

简介：陆卓然，复旦大学管理学院助理教授，美国加州大学洛杉矶分校经济学博士，清华大学经济学学士。主要研究领域为博弈论、契约理论、信息经济学和产业组织理论。他的多个科研项目获得了国家自然科学基金的资助。